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International Court of Justice

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Copy

No. 127

Text of the second appeal of President Roosevelt to Mr. Hitler on 25 August 1939

I have just received from the Polish President a reply to the message which I transmitted to your Excellency and to him last night.

(Here follows the text of President Moscicki's reply. President Roosevelt then continues in the following manner.)

Your Excellency has repeatedly declared publicly that the objectives and purposes pursued by the Reich are just and sensible.

In his reply to my message the President of Poland has set forth that the Polish government is determined to settle the controversial questions which have arisen between the Polish Republic and the German Reich by direct negotiations or by compromise, on the basis of the principles laid down in my message.

Human lives without number may still be spared, and the hope that the nations of the world of today may still be able to lay the foundations for a peaceful and more advantageous relation can still be maintained insofar as you and the Reich government would declare yourselves ready for the peaceful methods of settlement which the Polish government has already accepted. The whole world prays that Germany too will accept them.

The correctness of the copy is certified by:

(signed) (signature illegible)

Dr. Horn
Attorney-at-law.

- - - - - - - -

I, Wanda S. Tieszen, X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German langua and that the above is a true and correct translation.

22 March 1946

Wanda S. Tieszen
X 046 265

H0792-0004

TC No. 72/124

Copy

711 + 712

The following is the text of a message from President Roosevelt to Mr. Hitler of 24 August 1939.

In the message which I transmitted to you on 14 April I said that it seemed to me that the leaders of the major powers had the power to free their peoples from the threatening destruction, but that, if all sides did not without delay and with good will make efforts to effect a peaceful and constructive solution of the existing controversial questions, the crisis which the world is facing must lead to catastrophe. Today the catastrophe seems very near - in fact it seems to be already at the door.

I received no answer to the message which I sent you in April, but in the confident faith that the cause of world peace, is in itself the one cause of humanity which is above all other considerations, I turn to you again in the hope that the threatening war and the destruction which it would bring with it for all peoples, can still be avoided.

I therefore entreat you urgently and earnestly, and I address this same plea to the President of the Polish Republic, that the German and the Polish governments come to an agreement to refrain from any kind of direct hostilities for an acceptable limited period and that in a similar manner they come to an agreement to solve the controversial points which have come up between them in one of the following three ways.

First, through direct negotiations.

Second, by submitting these controversial points to an impartial court of arbitration in which both may have confidence; or

P. 2 Third, through willingness to solve these controversial points by way of compromise, by choosing as trustee or mediator a citizen of an American republic, all of which are free from any connection with or participation in European political affairs.

Since Poland and Germany are both sovereign states, it is of course clear that if one of the suggested ways is taken each state will declare itself willing to respect the independence and the territorial inviolability of the other.

The citizens of the United States of America are united in their rejection of any policy of military conquest and subjection. To a man they reject the theory that any ruler or any people is justified in achieving his aims and objectives through measures which would plunge innumerable millions of people into war and which would bring with them misery and suffering for every nation of the earth, whether belligerent or neutral, especially since these aims and objectives, insofar as they are right and just, can be attained by the way of peaceful negotiations or with the aid of arbitration. In the name of the citizens of the United States of America and, as I believe, in the name of all

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peace-loving men and women of the world, I turn to you... to declare yourself willing to settle the controversial points existing between your government and the government of Poland by accepting one of the solutions suggested by me.

I hardly need repeat that if the German and Polish governments should be willing to lay aside their quarrels in the suggested peaceful manner, the government of the United States is still ready to contribute its part to the solution of the problems endangering world peace, as stated in my message of 14 April.

The correctness of the copy is certified by:

- - - - - - - -

I, Wanda S. Tieszen, X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

21 March 1946

Wanda S. Tieszen
X 046 265

Ri. Exhibit No. 310

H0792-0006

Copy

714

from: Dokumente der deutschen Politik Volume 9 I

IV. Germany's relationship to the United States of America and the Latin American states.

Page 456

... On 14 March Roosevelt stated that "America will support every democracy and every nation that is fighting against Germany until total victory is won." At the same time he promised Greece, which had been at war with Italy since 28 October 1940, planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, ships, etc. After the Yugoslav government had joined the Tripartite Pact on 25 March in Vienna, without consideration of American intervention and attempts to influence her, Yugoslav property in the United States was immediately blocked--a measure which Roosevelt cancelled two days later, however, when the anti-Axis putsch government of Simowitsch, which he immediately recognized, had taken over the power in Belgrade by the coup d'etat of 27 March. ... Roosevelt had the property of the eastern European states which were friendly to Germany or occupied by Axis forces, blocked in the USA exactly as Norwegian, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Belgian property had been blocked in the summer of 1940.

The correctness of the copy is certified by:

(signed:) (illegible)

Dr. Horn
Attorney-at-law

I, Wanda S . Tieszen X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation.

21 March 1946

Wanda S. Tieszen
X 046 265

Ri. Exhibit No. 290/3

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Copy

from Sven H e d i n's "America in the battle of the Continents"

(Pp 100 - 108)

...
Page 99
...

When during the first year of war/peace/ was talked of far and wide, little confidence seemed to be placed in these statements. The elected deputies and representatives of the people outside of the legislative bodies again and again ascertained with anxiety and unrest that America let herself be driven into war without any force from the outside, merely by the policy of the government supported by a small minority.

Page 100

In Kansas City on 2 May 1941 Senator Bennet Champ C l a r k warned that the then current campaign to keep America out of war was at the same time a last ditch fight for democracy in the USA. In the same gathering Alf M. L a n d o n demanded that those opposed to war ought not to be subject to reproaches and ridicule on the part of the government.

...
Page 101

On 27 April 1941 Senator Gerald P. N y e stated as follows: "The same powers are making fools of us, who made fools of us during the World War. By deceit we are being convinced that we are able to create order in the chaos which is Europe. Our people will have to pay now or later and pay dearly for the aid which we are extending to England and for our own defense. Washington knows that we will have to pay some day, and it must create a genuine war in order to justify all these expenditures. If we should ever become involved in this war, it will be called by future historians only by one name, "the President's War" because every one of his steps since his Chicago speech has led to war."

A speech made on 18 December 1940/ by representative John G. A l e x a n d of Minnesota goes as follows:. ...."It is my opinion that this time we ought to help the European nations to achieve a lasting and just peace, instead of trying to build the future on further years of war and privation. A great campaign is taking place in the newspapers with the objective of making the American people feel like a flock of sheep which is crowded together into a corner waiting to be driven to the slaughter-house. We are being told that we could not remain on the outside and that we could not be successful with any constructive plan. This propaganda is one of the worst campaigns in history, a campaign to give the American people a feeling of inferiority and to make them submit to the wishes of a small group of alien leaders, who aim to plunge us into war."

P. 2

...
Page 102

Senator T a f t (Candidate for the presidency at the last election);" The bill would give the president power to declare war on any nation in the world and to join in the present war, if he so desires, which is apparently the case. No Congress with the exception of a 'rubber stamp Congress' would accept such a bill."

Senator La F o l l e t t e : "This is no bill to give the President full authority. It is a bill to dismiss Congress. It is a demand for Congress to renounce vital and important rights."

Page 103

Senator S h i p s t e a d : "Does anyone believe that in such a situation the executive branch of the government would give up, even for a moment the full authority which the bill H.R. 1776 would give to it? Any conceivable regime would fight desperately to keep all its authority, in order thus to choke a nation's dissatisfied criticism which is provoked to the very border of revolutionary rejection. Franklin D. Roosevelt is just as mistaken and is as weak as any other rulers who are dissatisfied with the evolutionary process of constitutional government."

Senator L o d g e : "The Lend-Lease law would create an internal dictatorship and would weaken the national defensive strength. The bill does not increase the danger of foreign wars and the danger of a totalitarian regime within the country, but it would enable the president to make agreements according to his own judgement with any country that pleased him.

...

P. 3 On 16 February 1941 representative Karl E. M u n d t of South Dakota said as follows: " Along the east coast a constantly increasing pressure is making itself felt on the population to intercede in favor of American intervention in the European war... The time has come to be on guard for pseudo-patriots who would like to lure our country into

Page 104

war. Entry into war or maintenance of peace is a decision which must be made in the interest of the boys on Main Street, but not in the interests of the bankers on Wall Street. It must be made so as to protect the mothers of men, not the merchants of death."

...

Now a few more opinions of Americans outside of the Senate and Congress:

American F e d e r a t i o n of Labor "Chronicle", 19 January 1941. "Month by month we are drawing nearer to war, not because the belligerent nations are drawing nearer to us but because of the actions of our own government."

Page 107

On 4 April 1941 Cardinal O'Connell: "There is extant a certain feeling that things are happening behind the scene of which the people have no knowledge. This is the kind of suspicion which gave rise to revolutions in Europe - suspicion of people toward their government. I know the people want to keep out of it, but the government seems to disregard their wishes, while it continues to talk of democracy. Certain secret maneuvers are steadily bringing us nearer to war. Each and every person would like to know just where we stand at the moment. It is not fair that a government which calls itself democtratic, act like that."

Dr. Morrison, publisher of the "Christian Century" in April 1941: "This is not America's war... How did it happen that in the heads of many Americans the idea has taken hold that this war is America's war or that it is America's duty for a second time to take part in Europe's battles? My reply must be very frank. My reply is that the President of the United States by a long series of statements and a multitude of actions has brought the nation into a situation in which

P. 4 public opinion no longer has the freedom to express its profound conviction against participation in this war. Step by step over a period of three years of official propaganda and official actions the nation

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has became more and more set on a policy of war, until finally the latest desperate argument in favor of war is that we have already gone too far to be able to withdraw... Far from being " America's war", this is "the President's war". In Chicago on the occasion of the bridge dedication in 1937, President Roosevelt began to meddle with this war, the "President's war". Step by step he has driven his war into the consciousness of the American people. In effect, the President himself has already declared war. He has indicated the enemy and he speaks of victory. Congress no longer represents the people."....

The correctness of the copy is certfied by:

Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney-at-law

I, Wanda S. Tieszen X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation.

23 March 1946

Wanda S. Tieszen
X 046 265

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Ri. Exhibit No. 290/4

719

Copy

from Sven Hedin "America in the Battle of Continents" ("Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente") (Pages 117/118)

P.117

On the problem "Here democracy - here president of democracy" I cite finally an article from the "Saturday Evening Post" of 5 December 1940. As is well known, this is an illustrated weekly with a circulation in the millions

"We are here speaking neither of war nor of peace.

While we are writing, the news is current that the President requested the Congress of the United States to resign. This is expressed calmly in the news. The headline of the 'New York Times' reads: 'Bill gives the President unlimited power to lend war armaments and aid.' The move of a genius, to make this appear a secondary matter. The official title of the bill is still tamer; it reads: 'A bill to promote the defense of the United States and for other purposes.'

Then we take a look at the bill. Remember, it is the President's own bill. It is what he desires. It is therefor the authentic revelation of his spirit. To judge by the bill, he wants the following:

Power according to his own choice, on his own conditions and as he sees fit, to wage undeclared wars everywhere in the world.

Power according to his own choice to make friends or enemies of other nations.

Power according to his own choice to use all the resources of the country for these purposes.

Power according to his own choice to conclude military alliances with other governments and to lend, lease, or transfer to other governments all the military resources of
P.2 the United States, with the sole exception of human beings, and that only because they are not expressly named.

P. 118

Power to issue by decree those laws which he considers necessary for the execution of his intentions.

Power to dispose of money to any amount.

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Power to give himself all the powers which he wants to have. Significantly, and for the first time in the eight-year history of the progressive withdrawal of Congress, there is no time limitation in the bill.

It can be for ever.

These are the normal powers of a dictator.

...

The correctness of the copy is certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney-at-law

- - - - - - -

I, Wanda S. Tieszen, X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

21 March 1946

Wanda S. Tieszen
X 046 265

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Copy

from Sven Hedin "America in the Battle of Continents" ("Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente") (Pp 85-90)

The Three-Power Agreement was accompanied in Germany and Italy by press comments in which one may read a warning to the United states to change over to a more cautious East Asia policy, a warning which unfortunately had the opposite result That the United States was at any rate conscious of the danger situation is shown by the instructions dated 17 October 1940 to American citizens in the Far East to leave for America immediately, and the strengthening of the garrison of Hawaii.

How the situation in Japan was regarded is shown by the statement of Sumita, the head of the Japanese military missio in Indochina, who said in November 1940: "If the United State were only willing to understand Japan's situation, every question between our two countries could be and would have to be adjusted easily. This necessitates only recognition of the principle that Japan is the stabilizing factor in the Far East." One month later the then Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka outlined the foreign policy of his government with loyalty to the Tripartite Pact on the one hand, with a desire for friendship with the Anglo-Saxon powers on the other. At the same time he described what a catastrophe a Japanese-American war in the Pacific would be for both countries. In January 1941 the whole Japanese press pointed out that in spite of the just quoted pleas by Japanese statesmen Roosevelt's attitude became increasingly hostile, and that Japan could not permit herself to be either intimidated or provoked by him, and by steadfastly holding to her policy had to answer the veiled and unveiled attacks on Japan during the campaign for the law to assist England. In the speech of Secretary of State Hull in January 1941 Japan saw a threat a

P. 2

the announcement that the United States intended to prescribe the laws for the Pacific area.

During 1941 Roosevelt constantly increased the tension between the United States and Japan. In order to seek a way Japan sent a special ambassador, Mr. Kurusu, to Washington, who held numerous conferences in the State Department with the accredited ambassador, Mr. Nomura. On 26 November Roosevelt made his demands and addressed them directly to the Tenno. He demanded the immediate discontinuance of the Japanese campaign in China and the recognition of Chungking China as the only legal government of all China. ... The dictatorial interference of a statesman who guards the freedom of decision of the inhabitants of another continent as jealously as Roosevelt does, was an insult to Asiatic power which could not be accepted in silence. One wonders whether Roosevelt nevertheless hoped that Japan would accept his demands and therefore kept his people and their legal representatives in ignorance of the note of 26 November. Even Senator Connally, the head of the Foreign Committee in the American Senate, did not see the note until three weeks after it was sent and ten days after the destruction of the American fleet by Japan at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt certainly knew that his note meant war against Japan, and gave Congress, Senate, and the people no information about his intentions.

P. 2 (cont.) At the same time through his silence he prevented the defense measures of keeping army and fleet constantly on the alert at the American outposts in the Pacific.

P. 87

The admirals and generals, who had no idea how close their country was to war with Japan, were court-martialed after the defeat for which they could not be prepared because their commander-in-chief kept vitally important information from them

P. 3 This sober presentation of the milestones on Roosevelt's path to war with Japan becomes somewhat more vivid if one reads American statements of the last few months. ... The widely read "Look" magazine in a May 1941 issue stated that America had been living for years in antagonism toward Germany and Japan and that the appeal to the Nine-Power Pact and the Conference of Washington was only as a subterfuge in order to veil her decision to have a final settlement with Japan. Since 1937 at least this had been clear to Germany and Japan, and the joining of these two states was the inevitable result of the realization.

The approaching conflict with Japan has taken up more and more space in the American press since the outbreak of war in Europe. It was thought, however, that the United States would be able to choose the time for it.

The most influential foreign political magazine of the United States, the quarterly "Foreign Affairs", in October 1941 published two articles. Professor Nathaniel Peffer of Columbia University hoped that the "expected conflict" with
P. 88 Japan could be postponed until the United States had completed her armament program. If the Chinese army were then still intact, Japan could be "eliminated at one blow". Boycott and blockade of the Japanese islands would finish what the American fleet and airforce would leave for the economic weapons to do. The result would be disturbances in Japan, especially if a conquered and impoverished Japan still had to pay war debts. Thus for the United States Japan's joining the Axis would in the long run prove to be a fortunate circumstance, for if the democratic countries defeated Germany, they would at the same time settle the Japanese threat as a purely secondary matter.

Equally significant of the American conception of a conflict with Japan was an article by Eugene Staley of the
P.4 Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which appeared in the same issue of "Foreign Affairs". He maintained that the United States should immediately offer Japan the choice between two courses. One would be to move nearer to Great Britain and the United States, giving up her membership in the Axis as well as her policy of the New Order in East Asia, in which case the two democracies could make markets and raw material deliveries available to her and offer her participatic in the industrial opening up of China as well as in South American trade. The second course for Japan would be rejection of this generous offer, and in this case the pressure on Japan would be increased through continued and increasing aid to China, through strengthening of the fortifications in Manila, Singapore, and the Dutch Indies as well as of the Soviet forces in eastern Siberia, and finally through the economic blockade of Japan, breaking off of relations, and hampering Japanese trade with Latin America. The result of such economic isolation which a coalition of the USA with Great Britain and Soviet Russia could effect without sending a single plane or ship into Japanese-controlled waters, would be disastrous for Japan.
...

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P. 4 (cont.) The journalist Ralph Ingersoll, who is close to Roosevelt as the result of a world trip he has just concluded, published in his New York paper "P.M." as well as in the London "Daily Express" on the same day, 25 November 1941, articles entitled, "America must destroy Japan". In them he demanded that the United States in collaboration with Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China should remove the Japanese threat by "striking immediately". Within 24 hours after the joint declaration of war of the four powers the British would have their fleet sail out of Singapore in order to drive the Japanese from the China Sea, the Americans would start their bomb wings from Manila to destroy the cities of Japan, built of easily inflammable wood and paper. The "victorious British
P. 5 and Americans" would then a few days later "meet in Hongkong... Cleansing the Pacific Ocean of Japanese from the west is the sole task of America." This cleansing does not even necessitate the sinking of the Japanese fleet, for if all four states strike at once the collapse of Japan will follow quickly, "and all this nonsense of the little supermen will be over." He then stresses once more that action must be taken quickly, for only then could "the United States win everything and lose nothing."

These voices disprove the assertion that Roosevelt was surprised by Japan's "treachery". ...

The correctness of the copy is certified by:
Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney-at-law

I, WANDA S. TIESZEN, X 046 265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

WANDA S. TIESZEN
X 046 265

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top secret.

120

The Fuehrer's Personality.

1.) I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time in August 1932. Then I saw him again in January at my house in Dahlem which I made available for two conferences between him and Papen, as it was situated in the suburbs of Berlin ; in the course of the year 1933 I then became Adolf Hitler's collaborator.

2.) Already at my first meeting with Adolf Hitler his entire personality left a strong impression on me. Strangely fascinating were his domineering blue eyes in his otherwise rather dark appearance. Already at that time I had the impression that this man, whose speeches I had read with such an interest, must be a most extraordinary personality. I was especially struck by his perfect self suffi cieney (without being reserved.). His thoughts and his remarks and the manner and form in which he uttered them, were entirely different from the ways of other men. They seemed to come from his inner being, they were simple and clear and for that reason probably were so convincing. Especially striking to me was the entirely personal, so to say final manner, in which he expressed his opinion. No discussion, no contradiction was possible. What he said were facts which had to be accepted by others. Doubtlessly he is strongly monomanic and a man who could scarely be influenced, no man for compromisses; that was my impression already at that time.

3.) I did not participate in the discussions at my house at the January meeting. At that time I could not arrive yet at a judgment of Adolf Hitler's personality. I only recall one incident : Von Papen explained that Reich President von Hindenburg intended to appoint Hitler as Vice Chancellor only. On this occasion I heard how extremely energetically Adolf Hitler expressed his opinion and I remarked for the first time the hardness of his character and his brutal frankness, with which he met any opposition.

4.) In the year 1933 I made the closer acquaintance of Adolf Hitler. If I were asked today whether I knew him well, what he thought as a politician and a statesman, what kind of a human being he was, what his innermost being was, - then I must confess that I only know very little about him, practically nothing at all. -

It is a fact that, although I lived through so many things with him during all those years of collaboration, I never could come near him in a human sense nor otherwise really, than on the first day of our acquaintance. He had something in his bearing which was indescribably aloof.

5.) Adolf Hitler was a man of solitude despite the fact that millions roved about him. In the same manner as I could not get close to him, I never saw anybody else who could do it, with the sole exception possibly of Goering and Hess.

6.) Besides Goering, Bormann and Hess there was nobody who was more intimate with Hitler. His inaccessibility was not artificial but given by nature. I believe that he even suffered from that as a human being. At that, he could be enchantingly amiable, warm and spirited, the first also in personal conversations, the latter mostly in intimate circles. If he wanted to win over a man or if he wanted to achieve something with a person he showed a never surpassed charm and a persuasiveness which would be hard to match. I have seen strong personalities going to him, their chest filled with all the truth they wanted to tell Adolf Hitler, that a catastrophe would occur if the one or the other thing would not be stopped and that they could not bear the responsibility any longer, and so on. After half an hour they emerged, radiant and satisfied, and very often represented Adolf Hitler's point of view with exactly the same conviction, which they had formerly held and which was often in contradiction to the point of view they had in approaching Hitler. The same also happened to me very often. Only that I, perhaps, was not quite so enthusiastic.

H0792-0016

as the others, butI was convinced nevertheless. I once talked to Minister Todt who had know Adolf Hitler for many years, about him, when Todt visited me in London. I talked about the great influence, which was exercised by Adolf Hitler on all human beings, even on foreigners and also personally on me. To this Todt replied that Adolf Hitler has always possessed the power in his eyes to eliminate the reasoning ability of other people or to paralyze it at least. This he had known for a long time already and this was one, but merely one of the secrets to Adolf Hitler's power over mankind.

7.) Adolf Hitler could also talk in an exceedingly fascinating, humoristic and even sparkling witty manner about his youth, his military service during the world war, his period of struggle, so that everybody felt attracted to him. And if he talked about art and architecture one felt again and again that he was by nature basically an artist. I could observe this especially well during the trip to Rome. When he then talked about his intentions in the artistic field in intimate circles, he won all hearts. I probably do not have to mention that he was of special generosity as far as the material spheres of life were concerned.

8.) The decisive trait in Adolf Hitler was his absolutely domineering personality, in great mass meetings as well as with politicians, military men, foreigners in more intimate circles and also in personal conversations. Among many, King Boris of Bulgaria once told me for instance, that such gigantic power and faith was emanating from Adolf Hitler that he himself personally could feast on it for months. This happened to everybody who had to deal with him. I have seen foreigners, who could not utter a word in his presence. Even strong personalities like Mussolini became quiet in his presence. Chamberlain and Daladier were strongly impressed by him. The immense self-confidence, which he radiated and the very often unimaginable severity of his will power, accompanied by an ingenious, simple and understandable way of expression was communicated to all who had anything to do with him and forced human beings under his spell. I once stood in a great meeting of many hundred thousands and observed how Adolf Hitler's words moved the masses. Everywhere I could observe enthusiasm, rage, affection, love and even tears for Adolf Hitler. At that time I said that the personality of this man in his effect on human beings and masses would probably be the greatest phenomenon of all times.

HO792-0017

9. It stands to reason that this influence was especially great on his immediate associates. This became more and more distinct with the increasing power position of Adolf Hitler. When one approached Adolf Hitler to report on something, one mostly had the feeling that he had already thought over the problem in question many times. Later on this developed in this way that, if one wanted to report an opinion to him, he would interrupt after a few phrases and refer to the problem himself, without giving another chance to the other person to voice his own opinion. The decision was then made always according to his opinion. An exchange of thoughts with Adolf Hitler, if such a thing existed at times in the beginning, did not exist anymore in later years. At meetings with foreign statesmen this monomanic way of the Fuehrer did not always work out happily. If he, for instance met with Mussolini, he usually talked for two hours, afterwards Mussolini talked who had only understood half of it correctly, for ten minutes. Then the Fuehrer was usually very content about the meeting, whereas I had to state remarkable divergences in the interpretations. Diplomatically this was very often very difficult for me.

Another factor must be mentioned here which is of importance in judging Hitler's personality. He was irascible and very often could not hold his temper. This showed up at times at diplomatic gatherings too. In this manner he wanted to break up the conference in Godesberg with Chamberlain, when he received the report about the Czech mobilization, when he spontaneously jumped up with a red head (typical sign). Chamberlain did the same. I intervened at that moment and in doing so saved the conference. Adolf Hitler thanked me for that expressly.

When Henderson acted bruskly with Hitler on August 28 by pounding his hand on the paper, Hitler's face became red. I foresaw a catastrophe, but I succeeded also here by interposing a distracting question to Henderson, to avert the matter. Afterwards Adolf Hitler said to Hess, that he nearly wanted to throw Henderson out. Once there was also such a situation in Vienna with foreign statesmen, so that Adolf Hitler pointed out my "angelic patience" to Count Ciano. The interpreter Schmidt was present at that time.

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During the war Adolf Hitler once told me after a visit quite openly : "You know, Ribbentrop, sometimes I cannot control myself."

10.) Adolf Hitler had his own original ideas in the field of foreign policy as well as in most of the other fields, internal politics, economics and military. His tremendous popularity and his great authority secured the unconditional adherence to his actions. He personally determined the foreign policy in all details. I carried them out. Without any doubt, his goal was in the beginning a unification of the Germans in Europe by diplomatic means, and an alliance with England.

He probably wanted to restore the military honor of Germany at the same time. This he told me once after the French campaign. Before the war he always talked about his desire for a peaceful solution which he certainly meant seriously, if England would have wanted it. After the victory in Poland and in the West, his plans reached farther, under influences which I mainly attribute to Himmler, i.e. towards the creation of a position of hegemony of Germany in Europe. However I never had occasion to talk to him openly about that.

Hitler regarded the fight against the East a fight between races and philosophies (as evidenced by German publication), which had to be waged for existence and the possession of Lebensraum. His character became more and more rigid and inflexible with the ensuing severity of this struggle and the great goals of safeguarding the German people, which he had set for himself. He very often called himself the toughest man, who ever lived. Suggestions to make a compromise, suggested changes concerning world ideologies caused only fits of wrath with him. His health declined by this. The tremendous overwork and responsibility weighed on him, he lived on vitamine products and his back became finally bent. The rigor of his character developed

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H0792 - 0020

into a certain stubbornness, and it became more and more difficult to talk to him. A political discussion was not possible anymore for quite a long time. He regarded everything only from a military point of view. He did not believe in the possibility of compromises and certainly was right in that respect, although I intented to try it in a different manner. He did not want to believe in a defeat of Germany and became harder and harder in regard to the measures t taken with the increasing severity of war. He told me repeatedly, that our special weapons, first the U-boats, later on the V-weapons, then airplanes would secure our victory despite of everything. In that he believed, - still six weeks before the end. I mused on the question whether he still was healthy. He looked terrible, face and hands were absolutely anaemic but his dispositions were absolutely clear. All suggestions on my part to try political solutions since 1942 were without any success. He believed that such attempts would be regarded by the enemy as indications of weakness and might be a stimulation to put forth their last and final power. Two arbitrary, very casual attempts undertaken on my part, caused serious differences between him and me. I could hardly accept the responsibility for it; however, during the winte 1944/45 I made an other one with Naellhausen.

Without any doubt was Adolf Hitler of the conviction that as long as the front was held, victory still could come. He did not say this but he only mentioned the coming change. He probably knew that poltically - only capitulation existed and this he did not want in any c se because he believed that this would mean the end of National Socialism and the Bolshewisation of Germany. Being of this opinion he rather would venture everything as long as there still was the smallest chance. He probably imagined, finally, that the example of an army and a people, - which had fought to the very last end and, even if it must be, was defeated, - must be better for the future of the German Nation as a symbol of heroism through which future generations could recover. Thus the end came.

A few days before his death Adolf Hitler among other things named as the cause for the defeat primarily the fact that he had not had sufficient time to make t nation and, first of all, the armed forces National-Socialistic to the bone.

11. Without any doubt the Fuehrer, regarded the world Jewry, - whose organization he was convinced of - during the last years more and more as the real cause for this war. This one could see from his speeches despite the fact that he did not talk to me about this theme, as he knew my opinion on it. I do not know the history of annihilations of the Jews. I do not know if Himmler started it or if Hitler tolerated it. In cannot believe that he ordered it; for such an action wo not fit into the picture I always believed him to be like. Adolf Hitler who did not eat any meat because he did not want that animals should be killed, in whom all children had such confidence, whom all of us idolized, - he cannot have give such a terrible order in cold blood. On the other hand, his last will allows the conclusion that he, at least, knew about it, if he did not even order it in his fanaticism against the Jews.

12.) There can be no doubt about one thing, that the Fuehrer had only one goal during his whole life: how can I serve the German nation. This was to be seen in his whole life, beginning with his youth, his conduct as an unknown soldier during the world war, and his entire life as a politican and leader of the German nation. He had lived absolutely unselfish, he had sacrificed his health and he did not think of any thing else, up to his last breath and by sacrificing his life, but of the future of the German people whom he loved above everything else. This was the standard for all his thoughts and actions. For this he made the great foreign-political decisions. Only in this way he believed in the chance of safeguarding the German future. That he failed there in, he called fate when he talked to me about it. History will decide <u>why</u> he failed.

13.) To judge about the character of a figure, a genius like Adolf Hitler, is very difficult. One cannot measure him by normal standards. The most outstandin about him was his glowing patriotism and his fanatical will to make Germany great. He was convinced of his mission, he believed providence selected him for it. He possessed an unbendable will-power and an unconceivable energy in pursuing his goals. His gift of comprehension and his intelligence were startling. His world conception and his imagination always indulged in great historical pers ectives and parallels. Frederik the Great very often was his model.

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H0792-0022

Despite all imagination he was realistic enough to judge situations soberly. But at great decisions he believed to be the executor ordained by fate for the German fate provided by omnipotente. He once told me that always before great decisions, mostly over night - a kind of certainty of a somnabulist would befall him, so that he all of a sudden would know exactly what he had to do. In the pursuit of the interests of the German people he was absolutely independent. He saw every thing only from this point of view. He also did not know of many hesitations in this respect, if vital interests of the German people were concerned. About this he talked very little to me, because I had doubts in foreign political respect. But sometimes it also was expressed in my presence. This is shown by the following: When the Fuehrer after the capture of Mussolini at last seemed to agree to my request to seek peace with Stalin as he once had done already before Stalingrad but rejected the contact again on the next day, — he saw my depression. A short while later he visited me in my barrak and when he left he made a sudden remark from which I could understand that, even if an agreement with Russia should be possible, Hitler could not regard it as a final solution in view of the abyss which, as he saw it, could not be bridged in world-political respect. At that time I was quite disturbed and said something to the effect, that one could loose all confidence in the world and could not make any foreign policy any more. But the Fuehrer did not go into that any more. Here is the way he was: Everything for the German people! I tried, after I had recognized this, to get him to change this attitude and I told him that it would have a very unfavorable effect in the conduct of a successful foreign policy. But I could not convince him. As faithful as Adolf Hitler was towards his own people who once had something for him - this, sometimes was even grotesque, - as much did he despise obligations toward foreign countries, if the necessities of life of the Germany nation indicated an other direction. If somebody had carried out something successfully, then often people came along, who understood to sow the seed of suspicion into him. He often listened to

slanderers and to certain people of doubtful character who always understood to gain influence with him. He also was able to hurt people knowingly. Without any doubt he could submit to the influence of people, who understood to fool him in a shrewd manner and, thus, to bring to the fore less attractive qualities or actions. A certain discord broke through on those occasions which I never quite anderstood. The principle of "Divide et impera" was carried through by him to such an extent that often many things overlaped in competence and that all his co-workers had to deal with inner conflicts under 50 % of their time. In foreign policy, - which was a extensive field and which everybody would like to exercise, - this was especially bad.

14.) My personal relation toward Adolf Hitler was of such a nature that, from the very beginning on, he attracted me by his unselfish devotion to his people. I openly admit that in the course of the co-operation his entire personality, his eyes and his whole manner drew me magnetically into his spell. He became for me Germany's symbol and I followed him. As many others were, so was I attached with tremendous love and devotion to Adolf Hitler. I advised him in foreign-political questions if he wanted to know my opinion, but always I restrained myself in times of important decisions, the genius alone had to decide. I have carried through some important foreign-political actions for him. He often was grateful to me. Somttimes his reactions and actions were incomprehensible to me. I had some serious differences with him. A very coal attitude sometimes lasted for weeks between us. But finally his fidelity came through again and again.-

Here I have to point out another fact: to facilitate things for himself, occasionally Adolf Hitler played the one against the other, by describing the attitude of a co-worker to the other man, whom he wanted to win for something, in a different light than it really was. This I found out on several occasions and also occasionally concerning my person as well as concerning other co-workers.

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H0792 - 0024

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My dovergence with him, in 1941, was a break in our personal relations. On the surface it then seemed to be allright to be reconciled on the outside but it really never was as it had been before. I did not understand Adolf Hitler at that time. In reality I could not do anything important anymore since that time. I told my co-workers at that time, that we would restrict ourselves in future entirely to carrying out orders form now on only.

What caused Adolf Hitler to treat me in that manner, I do not know.

If I recapitulate, I only can conclude this statement about the personality of Adolf Hitler with the words:

I do not know who he was - I only know one thing: that he was great!

sgd. Joachim von Ribbentrop.

H0792 – 0025

Ri.Exhibit Nr. 312.

Copy

Affidavit

156

to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg.

Having been informed of the signifinance of an affidavit and its legal consequences in case of intentional or negligent submission of such, I declare as follows:

I have been married to Joachim von Ribbentrop since 5 July 192o and ever since have been familiar with his political efforts and ideas. My husband did not belong to any political party until 1932. However, he followed the political occurrences in the turbulent twenties with great interest and tried at that time already to make his numerous foreign friends and acquaintances understand Germany's troubles, worries and efforts. He also devoted a considerable part of our active social life to these purposes. At that time many of our foreign friends cam to visit us in Germany upon our suggestion and invitation. Although he was not a member of the German People Party (Deutsche Volkspartei) which, at that time, was lead by Stresemann, with whose family we were acquainted, my husband supported the objectives of this statesman and his party. Having become apparent that at decisive international conferences neither the ability of Stresemann and that of his successors nor Germany's willingness and complaisance succeeded in freeing Germany from the situation forced upon her by the peace treaty, my husband, upon suggestions of his friend,

H0792 - 0026

approached the NSDAP in 1932. After two discussions with Hitler, one of which had completely negative results, my husband joined the NSDAP in fall 1932. A determining factor for my husband's decision to join the party was the conviction that the domestic and politico-economic situation becoming more and more critical could be improved only by a consolidation of all national forces. This conviction also was the reason why my husband in the critical hours before the seizure of power in January 1933 put our house at the disposal of the exponents of the parties of the right for the purpose of a meeting. My husband subsequently, put the biggest hopes on this coalition of the parties of the right and he willingly co-operated at their efforts to realize their goals. Making use of his foreign connections he supported Hitler's efforts of returning Germany to a respected place among the nations. To begin with he tried during numerous personal and later on official trips abroad, to effect Germany's disarmament and equality of rights.

During the period of his activities as ambassador in London my husband has endeavoured to continue the policy introduced by him in the spirit of the naval agreement. Unfortunately his policy met already at that time with serious difficulties due to the fact that he had to represent the ticklish Spanish nonintervention policy. While, nevertheless, our stay in London was one of the happiest times of our life, the following period during which my husband was Minister for Foreign Affairs, became a constantly growing martyrdom. The more and more radical handling of the Jewish and clerical questions, the constantly growing difficulties in foreign policy, resulting from same, the meddling of all kinds of agencies, offices and party leaders in foreign policy matters

H0792 - 0027

caused constantly growing frictions, arguments and annoyances. The growing radicalisation of the party and the hostile personal attitude of Himmler, Bormannand Goebbels against my husband finally weighed more and more on his mind and made him seem harsh to the outside, a trait which he did not have in former times. Himmler's hostility finally became so strong that I lived in constant fear for the life of my husband and my son.

Although my husband's initial absolute confidence in Hitler was greatly shaken, he felt nevertheless bound to him, by his oath, which in his opinion also bound him to his people. In many cases my husband - for reasons of statepolicy - felt obliged to uphold Hitler's opinions and orders to his subordinates although he either did not approve of them or in many cases had previously opposed them strongly in front of Hitler.

The outbreak of the war and the rumors which were being spread constantly about his attitude not being conciliatory brought about a nervous crisis on 3 September 1939 which, at that time, could be met only by constantly referring to his personal efforts to the contrary.

Being physically not very resistant due to the loss of a kidney and a very sensitive constitution, all these difficulties weighed especially heavily on my husband.

Nuernberg, 1 March 1946

sighed: Anneliese von Ribbentrop

Authenticity of above
affidavit and signature of Mrs. Anneliese von Ribbentrop

certified by:

(signed) Dr. Martin Horn

Defense Counsel.

H0792 - 0028

Ri. Exhibit No.313

131

Copy

Affidavit

by Secretary of Embassy Bernd Gottfriedsen

Having been informed of the significance of an affidavit, and especially of the penal consequences resulting from an intentionally wrong or negligent issuance of such a statement, I herewith answer the questions stated below as follows:

1st Question

What is your name ?

Answer Bernd Gottfriedsen, born March 2, 1911 at Brodesby near Schleswig.

2nd Question

What is your last occupation?

Answer My last occupation was Secretary of Embassy with the Foreign Office in Berlin. In was in charge of the administration of a special department dealing with financial matters of the Foreign Office and especially those of the Reich Minister. In addition, I was liaison officer to the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, My special mission consisted of keeping in constant touch with the Japanese Ambassador and his closest coworkers.

3rd Question

What can you state concerning the financial affairs of the Reich Foreign Minister, particularly how was his conduct in financial matters ?

Answer

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In 1939, I was charged with the financial administration of the funds of the Reich Foreign Minister and of special official funds. When taking over my department, I was ordered by the then Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to carry out a strict separation between his private and official financial dealings. He ordered me especially to keep his personal and official expenses strictly separated. That was the way it had been handled in the past, too, as I learnt when taking over the department. During the years 1939 - 1945 when I managed the department, private expenses of the Reich Foreign Minister were, of course, paid from his private income while his official income was used for official purposes of the Reich Foreign Minister.

The details of making entries in the books and settling accounts were handled, under my constant control, by my secretary, a Miss Seifert, last residing at Rendsburg, Holstein. By order of the Foreign Minister the separation of his private and official financial needs was carried out very correctly, even strictly. Once or twice a year the Reich Minister had an end balance complete with vouchers submitted to him. Beyond that, this balance and those vouchers were examined by an outside public accountant, Dr. Brodt, in Berlin.

H0792-0029

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4th Question.

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Did von Ribbentrop's private property increase during the years of his diplomatic activities?

Answer:

Available property values having been preserved and no new real estate having been acquired, his estate, as a whole, from what I could observe especially during the time he was Foreign Minister remained about the same with the exception of 2 donations of RM 500,000 each which were subject to property taxation.

5th Question:

What about von Ribbentrop's art possessions?

Answer:

Mr. von Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life. During the time of my activities in the above mentioned department, he acquired some painting, for the most part on he art market in Germany itself. Every one of these paintings was acquired properly and above all, at correct prices and, of course, paid for out of private funds of the Reich Foreign Minister. During the time he was Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the Foreign Office and German legations, which objects became property of the state and were used accordingly. All these art objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory. No foreign art objects were acquired illegally - i.e. by pressure etc.

H0792-0031

Mr. von Ribbentrop's private art objects, too, were catalogued and the objects themselves marked distinctly by me.

In summing it up, I can say that Mr. von Ribbentrop's conduct in financial matters as well as his private economic life were absolutely unobjectionable as far as I could see.

During the war, he did not acquire any art objects illegally from any of the territories occupied by German troops - be it for his own private use or for the Foreign Office or the Reich.

Nuremberg, 16 March 1946

sgd. Bernd Gottfriedsen,

Bernd Gottfriedsen.

Copy certified by:

Dr. Horn

Defense Counsel.

We, Annemarie C. Catlin, Theodore Lit, Harry M. Frohmann hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that above is a true and correct translation of Document No

March 25th 1946

Annemarie C. Catlin
X 046172

Theodore Lit
X 046185

Harry M. Frohmann
X 046322

Ri - Exhibit Nr. 314

Copy 743

Biennial Report of THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES AR

Page 3 Para. 7: ..... The axis, as a matter of fact, existed on paper only. .....

Page 1, Para.9: Nor is there evidece of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.

In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan.

Here were three criminal nations eager for loot and seeking greedily to advance their own self-interest by war, yet unable to agree on a strategic over-all plan for accomplishing a common objective. .....

I herely certify that this is a true copy.

Dr. Martin Horn
attorney at law.

H0792 – 0032

H0792 - 0033

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 315

P S 1834

C o p y

Berlin, March 2, 1941

Foreign Office

attached to

744

Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs No. 56 R

.....

.....

.....

E x c e r p t

from the Memorandum of the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassado O s h i m a in Fuschl on February 23, 1941.

.....

page 8 Sect. 2: So far as America is concerned the Reichs Foreign Minister continued, it must be stated that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. He really wants to enter the war. However, we were interested, in keeping America from entering the war.

.....

page 9 Sect. 3: We believed, however, that it must be possible by a cleverly coordinated policy of the Axis powers, to keep America from entering the war.

.....

But we had the desire, to finish the war quickly and to force England to beg for peace soon. The Fuehrer was ..... determined to bring the war to a quick victorious speedy end as soom as possible. To achieve this, the co-operation with Japan was of importance. But in her own interest Japan should intervene as quickly as possible. By doing so the key-position of England in Eastern Asia would be destroyed.

Japan on her part would hereby secure her own position in East Asia, which she can achieve only by war. Three reasons are decisive for a quick action:

page 10 sect.2: 1.) An intervention by Japan means a decisive blow against the nucleus of the British Empre (threat to India, sea warfare etc.) The effect on the morale of the English nation would be a very serious one and would thereby contribute to ending the war soon.

sect. 3: 2.) Japan's sudden intervention could probably keep America from entering the war. America, as yet unarmed could hardly do so as she would hesitate to expose her fleet west of Hawaii to a risk. If Japan would otherwise respect America interests an argument invoking prestige by which Roosevelt could possibly justify the war to the Americans, would not be at hand. America could hardly declare the war, only to be powerless and unable to do anything about it when in such a case Japan would seize the Philippines."

.....

page 11 sect.2: The Reich Foreign Minister then mentioned that, if America would declare war on account of Japan's entering the war, this would be an indication that she had intended in any case to enter the war sooner or later. Even if it would be better to prevent this, such an entry into the war would not be decisive in any way, for reasons already state.

.....

page 12/13 sect.3: The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that precisely in view to the desire to keep America out of the war, clear language should be used. Only if one would recognize in the United States that one was facing an iron determination, one would restrain oneself.

H0792-0034

H0792 - 0035

746

page 13: ..... Therefore one must have a clear and strong policy regarding the USA, naturally not an aggressive one. One should know in USA that Germany, Italy and Japan have nothing against the American people, but that possible aggressive desires would confront an iron front of determine nations. .....

Copy certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney at Law.

I, Theodore Lit hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that above is a true and correct translation of Document No.

March 26, 1946

Theodore Lit
X 046185

H0792 - 0036

Ri. Exhibit No. 316

1877 PS 747

Notes of the Reich Foreign Minister 19/41.

Memorandum

concerning the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka at Berlin on March 29, 1941.

Page 1 sect. 1: The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the previous discussion with Matsuoka regarding the latter's pending conferences at Moscow with the Russians. He expressed the opinion that it would be the best in the regard to the general situation, not to get too envolved with the Russians, He did not know how the situation would develop .....

page 1 sect. 1: He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believed however, that Russia would not create any warlike complications .....

page 2 sect. 1: One naturally could not know how things with Russia would develop. It is uncertain whither Stalin would intensify this present policy of unfriendliness towards Germany. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) would like to point out by all means to Matsuoka that a conflict with Russia would nevertheless be within the sphere of possibilities .....

page 6 sect. 1: The Reich Foreign Minister then informed the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in the further course of the discussion, of his personal opinion as to real Russian interests. The Soviet Union would like war to last as long as possible. She knew that she by herself could not achieve anything by military attacks. Therefore the quick defeat of France had not have been to the liking of the shrewd politician Stalin, who hoped for a long war, which would tire the nations and would make them ripe for Bolshevist influence. This is the real goal of Russian policy which one must never let out of one's view.

page 9 sect. 1: The Reich Foreign Minister replied that America could not do anything at all against Japan should it seize Singapure. Only on account of this reason alone Roosevelt would, perhaps reconsider a decision for any active procedure against Japan. For, while on the one hand he could not do anything against Japan on the other hand the probability would exist that the Philippines would be lost to Japan, which would naturally entail a great loss of prestige for the American President, who could not do anything about it on account of enadequacy of American armament.

page 10 sect.1: The Reich Foreign Minister stated, that in his opinion, Japan's declaration of war on England should take the form of an attack on Singapure.

.....

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Copy certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney at Law.

I, Theodore Lit hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that above is a true and correct translation of Document No.

March 26, 1946

Theodore Lit
X 046185

H0792 - 0037

H0792 - 0038

Ri Exhibit No.317

749

Copy

No. 178/1945

Copy
Document roll No.178

Affirmation in lieu of oath.

On five December
nineteen hundred forty - five

5 December 1945

appeared before me,

Dr. Sigmund Held,

Notary in Nuernberg, at my place of business, Maxfeld-strasse 51/III in Nuernberg,

Frau Annelies von Ribbentrop,
nee Henkell, wife of the former Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, residence Eching on the Ammersee.

This person assured me of her identity by showing me: her driver's license with photograph, issued by District Office Mainz on 4 October (read) 1922,
and
her registration card of 16 July 1945, with her own signature.

Since Frau von Ribbentrop stated that she wanted to make a statement in lieu of oath, I first instructed her on the significance of such an affirmation, especially on its religious and penal importance.

Thereupon she stated, with a request for authentication:

H0792-0039

750

P. 2

I herewith submit for affixing to this document a statement signed by me today and headed "Affirmation in lieu of Oath", and affirm herewith

in lieu of oath

that the facts given by me in this statement are fully and completely true and that I know of nothing which would contradict the correctness and completeness of my statements.

I bear the costs and request the preparation of two copies.

Read aloud by the notary, including enclosure, approved and signed by the deponent:

(signed) Annelies von Ribbentrop

L.S.: Dr. Held,

Notary, Notary's Fee Reg.No.178

Value: 3,000 RM

Notary's fee Paragr.43	16.00
Copying fee	1.00
turnover tax (Ums.St.)	0.34
total	17.34

The Notary:

(signed) Dr.Held

The above copy, corresponding to the original, is herewith given on request to

Frau Annelies von Ribbentrop,

nee Henkell, wife of the former Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, residence Eching on the Ammersee,

as an interested party.

Nuernberg, five December nineteen forty-five.

Seal Dr.Held

Notary

H0792-0040

751

Affirmation in lieu of oath.

I herewith affirm the following in lieu of oath, after being expressly informed that any untrue statement in this affirmation is subject to severe penalty.

In 1940 we had a very inadequate air-raid shelter in the foreign office (official residence). During air-raids we therefore, on the orders of Adolf Hitler, used the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he thought it of importance that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister, and the documents of the foreign office should be safe from air-raids. I was at that time expecting my younges child, which was born on 19 December 1940, and can therefore clearly remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event, which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tripartite Pact. He presented the possibilities of such diplomatic action and his process of thought, as to how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact. I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation with the words: "Ribbentrop, why shouldn't we be able to manage that, too, when we have managed so many things."

My husband presented his ideas with great elan and with great impressiveness. After he had finished, I noticed that Adolf Hitler,

H0792 - 0041

P. 4 who had received my husband's statements without pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absent-minded, so that I had the impression that my husband's statements had not made any convincing impression.

My father-in-law, Richard Ribbentrop, died on 1 January 1941. I can still remember that the old gentleman, who was very much interested in politics in spite of his years, said when my husband mentioned concern over Adolf Hitler's attitude in regard to the pact with Russia, that if we wante to lose the war we should just attack Russia. During this conversation and in several later conversations with me, my husband always held the viewpoint that a war with Russia was to be avoided under all circumstances and that he had always tried to influence Adolf Hitler toward avoiding a war with Russia. I also recall that my husband told me that Adolf Hitler finally forbade him altogether to engage in any more conversations about Russia, especially outside.

Nuernberg, 4 December 1945

(signed) Annelies v. Ribbentrop

The correctness of the copy is certified by:
(signed)
Dr. Horn
Attorney-at-law

I, MARTHA VON GRONEFELD, AGO 046 272, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation.

MARTHA VON GRONEFELD
AGO, 046 272

File Copy

Ri. Exhibit No. 318

753

Copy

Sworn Statement

of

Rudolf H E S S

According to an affidavit of the former American Consul General in BERLIN MESSERSCHMITH, Document 2385-PS, U.S.A. — Exhibit 68, the Fuehrer and I were supposed to have asserted that Germany was striving for world domination.

So this I declare under oath:

I have never made such a assertion to anyone,

In my attitude toward the question of world domination I was and am decidedly influenced by the Fuehrer himself.

The Fuehrer has repeatedly expressed his opinion to me something like this, once during the war:

It would be a great misfortune for the German people if Germany were to strive for world domination. For by that it would be divided in its aims. It would be diverted from the really vital aim: The winning of a large, enclosed living space in Europe.

Such a space of sufficient size would be the all the more important because through that the possibility of friction with the great sea and world trade-powers could be eliminated to a great extent. By that, however, the prospects for the maintenance of peace for Germany would be correspondingly increased. For the situation without sufficient German space would be the following:

H0792 — 0042

H0792 - 0043

Since Germany could draw the necessary food stocks and raw materials from her own territory in part only, she was forced to import considerable quantities from abroad. For the duration, however, she could pay for these imports only by disposing of export goods on the world markets. In order to secure work and bread for her population, she therefore was forced to export at any price. This, however, meant the fiercest competition toward the remaining powers dependent on world trade. Every ton, which Germany was exporting, would for example lower English disposition accordingly. England, however, was more dependent on imports and thereby exports than any other country. As a result of this, the countries whose own interests were being endangered showed a tendeney to exclude the undesirable competitors by force, if necessary. Whereby, to top this off, subjects interested in international entanglements utilized a situation of this kind.

If Germany, on the other hand, had a sufficiently large area at her disposal to ensure her self-sufficiency to a large extent, the necessity for exporting at any price with all the dangers resulting from it would disappear.

The final goal of the Fuehrer in this respect was an alliance between Germany as great continental power, and the other sea-powers.

The Fuehrer considered the dnager, which lies in the persuation of world-mastering-plans for Germany as so great, that he intended to include a warning from it in his political testament, as he once told me. Because as little as the successor should be directed in questions of minor importance the more justified it was in such questions concerning fundamentals on a large scale. He wanted in a way to use the German people themselves as watchmen by anchoring the warning in the political testament, in the event that one of his successors was to leave the line drawn for him, and become subject to world-mastery phantasies, as he expressed himself.

Such statements by the Fuehrer for the most part were connected with reports about German plans of mastering the world, which appeared in the world from time to time. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, that these claims were being staked in order to spread distrust against Germany, above all in England He believed that they originated from the activity of international war monger (Brunnenvergifter).

H0792-0044

The statement of the former American Consul-General in Berlin, MESSERSMITH, which has been mentioned above in his sworn statement, is untrue, insofar as my person is concerned. In view of the various statements of the Fuehrer toward me, which can be interpreted in one way only, it is as good as certain, that they are also untrue with respect to the Fuehrer.

Nuernberg, 7 February 1946.

(signed) RUDOLF HESS

Certified true Copy:

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law.

1 April 1946

I, CATHERINE BEDFORD, Brit.Civ., 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original Document.

CATHERINE BEDFORD
Brit.Civ.,110651

H0792-0045

Copy

Sworn Statement

of

RUDOLF H E S S

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I answer to the following questions on oath as follows:

1st question: Do you know that Herr von RIBBENTROP's conceptions in the field of Foreign Policy did not always coincide with those of the Fuehrer?

Answer: That is correct. And this certainly was obvious from statements, which he himself made to me during the last few years before the war, and also from the Fuehrer's statements to me at the same time.

2nd question: Where did the difference in conception lie?

Answer: The difference lay above all in the method of handling questions of foreign politics. The then Reich Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP was in favor of restriction to purely diplomatic means, such as diplomatic negotiations and the creation of a combination of powers favorable for Germany. He advised earnestly against military demonstrations or actual use of the Military Forces of the Reich to attain foreign political aims. This applies also particularly to the Polish crisis.

The Fuehrer's point of view, on the other hand, was, that all attempts by Germany to remove, or even only make more bearable, the treaty of Versailles by purely diplomatic means, had failed beyond doubt. This in spite of the fact that famous statesmen on the side of the adversaries were in favour of a revision, as was the co-signatory LLOYD GEORGE.

The Eastern neighboring states with German minorities had constantly ignored the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the treatment of those minorities, by taking away their rights, confiscating their property, eradicating their culture, persecuting and illtreating them. The co-signatories of the Treaty had permitted these things to take place.

Poland and Lithuania were bound by the Versailles-Treaty, to allow

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voting in certain territories with minorities. Instead of that they produced accomplished facts, relying on force. The co-signatories of the treaty permitted that to take place.

The adversary co-signatories of the Versailles Treaty had not kept the promise to disarm contained therein.

Germany had been patient for about 15 years. The Fuehrer's personal attempts by purely diplomatic methods to safeguard Germany's rights and to attain her vital, foreign-political aims had also been in vain. Under these circumstances he considered it his right and his duty in the interest of the German people to make use now of the adversary's methods.

I should like to emphasize, that I myself was absolutely of the Fuehrer's opinion - and still am today.

Nuernberg, 12 February 194.

s/: RUDOLF HESS.

Certified True Copy.

s/ Dr. Martin HORN

t/ Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law.

1 April 1946

I, CATHERINE BEDFORD, Brit. Civ., 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original Document.

CATHERINE BEDFORD

Brit.Civ., 110651

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Ribbentrop 319

Affirmation in Lieu of an Oath.

Having been informed of the fact that my declaration is to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal, and having been advised as to the penal consequences of perjury, I herewith affirm the following in lieu of oath:

1.) From 1937 to 1940 I was employed in the Foreign Office as attache and later on as Legation Secretary in the Branch of Political Section V (Poland, Russia and Danzig) and from 1943 on, after completion of military service and return from Athens, I was employed in the Department of the Interior dealing with Jewish questions.

2.) As can be seen from Document D 3319 PS GB 287, the defendant von Ribbentrop decreed the establishment of the Information Agency XIV (anti-Jewish action abroad) in 1943 or 1944, and put Ambassador Schleier in charge. According to figure I of the document, it was the task of this agency to co-ordinate all those expert specialists of the sections and working staffs of the Foreign Office who are interested in anti-Jewish information from abroad and who follow up and augment anti-Jewish information from abroad.

3.) This information agency was to co-operate closely with all agencies outside the Foreign Office, which were active in anti-Jewish propaganda, and with the German missions in Europe.

4.) In addition to the collaborators and expert specialists who were to be directly assigned to this agency, the trade-political, culture-political, radio political sections, etc. on page 2 of the document were to be part of it.

5.) Outside the Foreign Office the following agencies were additionally active in anti-Jewish work.

1) The Rosenberg Agency (Main Office Cosmo-political authorities (Uberstaatliche Maechte)

2) The so-called "European Plan" (Europaische Aktion) founded Ministerial Director Dr. Berndt (Propanganda Ministry).

3) The anti-Jewish World League.

4) The Institute for Research in Jewish Questions at Frankfurt/Main.

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5) World Service (Institute for the Solution of Jewish Questions) at Frankfurt/Main.

6) Office VII of the Reich Security Main Office at Berlin.

6.) A whole series of information agencies - perhaps 15-16 - existed under the Foreign Office, whose task it was to collect information on certain subjects and to forward it to the proper agency. The establishment of Information Agency XIV cannot be considered otherwise. Both of the above-mentioned agencies Rosenberg and European Plan were primarily occupied with anti-Jewish propaganda. This propaganda primarily concerned foreign countries, where propaganda was being practiced with a damaging effect on the direction of foreign policy. Ribbentrop was trying to get this propaganda under his control, in order to avoid harmful effects and to restrain this pettifogging (rabulistisch) propaganda. He therefore established the above-mentioned Information Agency which was to try to direct propaganda abroad centrally.

7.) The practical execution of this arrangement was as follows: Ambassador Schleier informed himself in Conferences with the individual expert specialists of the information agency about every fortnight regarding the material which had accumulated in the meantime, then gave his instructions for the utilization of the material, which consisted of Jewish and anti-Jewish material, and directed its distribution to the Missions of the German Reich abroad.

8.) Schleier had been charged by the Foreign Office to watch out and see that the Foreign Office was not bypassed when the previously mentioned agencies initiated parallel propagandist action, but was employed in a leading capacity. Schleier's efforts met with extraordinary difficulty from the previously named agencies; frequently he was not informed or only very late. This made it extraordinarily difficult for him to guard the interests of the Foreign Office in his constant conflict with the leading personalities of these agencies. As the result of this, this information agency could not, in the long run,

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carry out any practical work at all.

9.) The meeting of 3 April 1944 at Krumhuebel was not an international congress, but a purely internal working session of members of the Foreign Service, to which representatives of the Rosenberg Agencies and those of the Reich Security Main Office had been invited. I cannot say if Schleier had called the meeting with the express consent of the defendant v. Ribbentrop or within the framework of the general direction of the work. I do not know either, if Ribbentrop personally saw Schleier's report about this session; it may well be possible that this was not the case, because his ministerial office, as I know, at times did not submit to Ribbentrop matters which it did not consider of particular interest.

10.) The idea of an anti-Jewish congress originated with the Rosenberg Agency (Hagemeier). The Foreign Office opposed this plan, and as I know form information given me by Schleier, Ribbentrop also opposed this congress, which in its proposed form would have been absolutely nonsensical.

Since Rosenberg apparently had the consent of the Fuehrer for holding the congress, the attempt was to be made, according to the order issued by Ribbentrop to Schleier, either to prevent the congress in spite of this or, if this were not possible, to steer it into paths which were unthinkable from the foreign-political standpoint. Therefore in unison with the Institute for Research in the Jewish Question the plan was discussed of placing the congress on a basis which avoided political and polemic discussions.

The anti-Jewish congress did not take place.

11.) I had no opportunity of discussing the Jewish question with Ribbentrop in person. However, on the basis of the instructions which we received, I can state with certainty that Ribbentrop always exercised his influence moderatingly on the internal German agencies with regard to the Jewish question. As the reason for this he pointed out the harmful consequences for foreign-policy.

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This could be seen especially clearly from his attitude:

a) Toward the Rumanian request with regard to special treatment of Rumanian Jews within the area of German sovereignty (Spring of 1943)

b) from his attitude within the framework of the repatriation plan for foreign Jews from Germany

c) from the inclusion of foreign Jews in the exchange of internees.

In these three particularly outstanding cases we had the greatest difficulty in carrying through this attitude of Ribbentrop with the very radical Office IV of the Reich Security Main Office. (RSHA).

12.) With regard to the memorandum, which is attached to Document 3319-PS I personnanly, have not had any knowledge of this memo up to now. Neither does this memorandum show that a corresponding report was sent to the Foreign Office at all. In the particular secrecy with which the EICHMANN agency surrounded the annihilation of the Jews, I would suppose that this memorandum only went directly as a so-called "green telegram" from Bucharest to EICHMANN, so that the Foreign Office and RIBBENTROP could not even have any knowledge of it.

13.) I have only seen a very few protests from the Vatican with regard to the treatment of the Jews. We have investigated these cases. After having obtained the information in the individual cases named by the Vatican, we tried to procure sufficient information for the Nuncio although our work was hampered by other agencies with the indication that the Vatican was in no way authorized by International Law to intervene in this manner.

14.) The Foreign Office had nothing to do with Jewish and Concentration camps. The Jewish camps, as far as I know, were separate from the concentration camps. The former came under the authority of EICHMANN, the latter were subordinated to the Economic and Administration Main Office (Pohl).

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At the request of Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office the Jews were to be included in the exchange of internees. As the result of this I visited in the spring of 1943, the camp of Bergen-Belsen which was intended as a temporary camp for Jews who were to be included in this exchange. Conditions in the camp were perfectly satisfactory with the exception of minor points which could be rectified.

In order to orient myself I also visited the Theresienstadt Camp in 1943 and then once more in 1944 with delegates from Denmark and the International and Danish Red Cross, in order to give them the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the camp where Danish Jews were being transferred.

In April 1945 I once more visited Theresienstadt, in order to examine beyond a shadow of doubt, foreign reports about the supposed daily destruction of several thousands of Jews. During all the three visits neither I nor the Foreign delegates saw anything which could have been construed as atrocities.

Nuernberg, 21 June 1946

s/ Dr. Eberhard v. Thadden

This is to certify the above signature of Legation Councillor First Class Eberhard von THADDEN, which was written in my presence.

Nuernberg, 21 June 1946.

s/ Dr. Georg Froeschmann
Defense Counsel of the
defendant v. Ribbentrop

Certified True Copy:

s/ Dr. M. Horn
t/ Dr. Martin Horn

Defense Counsel of the
defendant v. Ribbentrop

Best - Ribbentrop

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A f f i d a v i t .

Being aware of the fact that my statement is to be submitted as evidence t the IMT and being aware of the penal consequences of any false statement, I herewith depose and say the following in place of oath:

1.) As a Ministerialdirektor of the Foreign Office, I was Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark with headquarters in Kopenhagen from 5 November 1942 to t end of the war. As such I had the function of an Ambassador and of a political and economic representative of the occupying power, although I did not carry the title of Ambassador.

2.) In the Foreign Office there existed a department "Deutschland", whose mission it was to deal with relations of the Foreign Office towards other Reich Ministries.

This department also dealt with the treatment of the Jews in occupied territories. In the first half of 1943 I received an inquiry from this departme as to whether the Jewish problem in Denmark could not be solved in a like manner as it was being solved in the rest of the occupied countries. Thereupon in various detailed reports I opposed this with the argument, that in consequence of the numerical inferior total of Danish Jews, their insignificance politically and the legal concept of the Danes, such a measure wou have an extraordinary damaging effect in Denmark as well as in Sweden. The motive for this opinion was my conception - which was realized in my entir political activity - that, considering the assurances that had been given Denmarks sovereignty and integrity, such an encroachment which would viola the provisions of agreements was not justifiable.

I myself always judged the Jewish question from the point of view, that Jewry had to be respected like any other people and that in the event of their being forced to live as a minority with other people they were to be treated as a political and legitimate minority. Therefore I was against an evacuation of Jews, such as took place during the war.

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3.) It was customary for the Foreign Office to inform me of all aspects in which it did not agree with my point of view. Inversely on being silent on important particulars and reports I could assume with certainty that the contents and opinion of these reports and particulars were approved by Herr von Ribbentrop.

Upon all my reports and suggestions made on behalf of the proposed solution of the Jewish problem to the Foreign Office, I have never received any critizising directive by the same. Therefore I can accept with certainty that von Ribbentrop also approved of my opinions.

4.) Between the Danish Government and myself there existed conceivably good relations up to August 1943. The enemy in this respect even spoke of Denmark as the "Model Protectorate". According to my point of view, the enemy intended to disturb these good relations in order to get Denmark on their side. The enemy believed to be in position to create unrest in the Fuehrer Headquarters, by inciting acts of sabotage and ter in Denmark and thereby inducing Hitler to take measures which would stir up the Danish population against Germany and which would have a damaging effect upon Germany in the eyes of the world. The "Model Protectorate" was to be destroyed.

Since I looked through these machinations, I opposed a policy of retribution, von Ribbentrop wholly supported me in this respect; for he considered Denmark the "his parade horse" and he was not willing to let things happen in Denmark which would disturb his foreign policy. I consider it impossible that he desired, of his own volition, such drastic measures as the evacuation of Jews and counter terror acts.

5.) In consequence of the acts of sabotage, which the C-in-C of the Wehrmacht reported to the Fuehrer Headquarters, a military state of emergency was proclaimed in Denmark on 29 August 1943. Thus, I was temporarily eliminated from my activity. Up to this period, nothing was known to me of an order concerning the evacuation of Jews. The order was then proclaimed via Himmler in September 1943.

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There existed no German executive authority in Denmark up to the time when on 29 August 1943 the Wehrmacht took over executive authority. For the carrying out of the action against Jews, Himmler dispatched Guenth, a special chief from the office "Eichmann" from Berlin to Kopenhagen. Prior to his arrival, I once more pointed out my misgivings towards su measures to the Foreign Office in a telegram, and I reiterated, that i the order was to be carried out at all the state of emergency could no be lifted prior to the carrying out of the action, because of the dang of the development of unrest. I sabotaged the success of the intended action against the Jews, by informing certain Danish politicians prior to the designated and published proceeding of the action, of measures t be taken and of the time of execution, with the result that about 6 00 Danish Jews went to Sweden which left only 4 - 500 Jews in Denmark to be arrested. I believed to have acted in the German interest and in th sense of the true concept of my minister v. Ribbentrop.

6.) After all this, I consider it impossible to have made an assertion such as mentioned in the affidavit by Mildner. A misunderstanding must involved there. Unquestionably I perhaps sometimes disapprovingly asse that von Ribbentrop did not prevail upon Hitler for a successful carrying out of our foreign policies. I cannot remember, whether I have made such an assertion towards Dr. Mildner. The already mentioned acts of terror in Denmark were the cause of a conference in Hitler's Headquarters on 30 December 1943, in which I was ordered to participate. Beside myself, several representatives of the Wehrmacht and of the Police were present. Von Ribbentrop was confined to a sickbed in Steinort an did not participate in this conference. Hitler at that time described the Danish situation as intolerable and declared, that he had decided to us the same measures as the opponent in a partisan war and to answer sabot ge with sabotage and attacks upon Germans with attacks upon Danes.

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The enemy later described this as an act of "clearing murder". I contradicted this by pointing out, that conditions in Denmark were not as bad as they were pictured and were only presented in such a light by the enemy. I demanded normal judicial proceedings at that time. Hitler rejected this. After the conference I reported to Ribbentrop, who agreed with my opinion.

I requested him to protest the instructions of Hitler on his part, and he assured me, that he would do so. He requested me to keep him currently informed on events in order that he may have the necessary particulars.

Nuernberg, 28 June 1946

(signed): Dr. Werner B e s t

I herewith certify the authenticity of above signature of Ministerial direktor Dr. Werner B e s t, as given in my presence.

Nuernberg, 28 June 1946

(signed): Dr. Georg Froeschmann
Defense Counsel of
defendant von Ribbentrop.

(Signed): Dr. Martin H o r n
Defense Counsel of
defendant v. Ribbentrop

T R A N S L A T I O N

R[illegible] 321

A f f i d a v i t

Instructed that my declaration is destined to be produced to the International Military Tribunal and cautioned as to the punishable consequences of any breach of an oath, I now make the following statement in lieu of oath:

In the course of the cross-questioning I had some very voluminous documents placed before me, which I had never seen previously. These documents are not formal records, but notes taken down by third parties many days after conversations. In these notes the writer of same recorded the subject-matter of the conversations in abbreviated form, used words of his own usage to record the opinions expressed and partly words of persons other than those who actually spoke them and which he put into their mouth owing to lack of memory.

There was thus no possibility for me to test these documents, the time they were noted down, and their truthfulness, nor to make additions or corrections. I have now studied these documents in detail and therefore make the following additional statement:

1) Documents D 735, D 740, D 741 refer to guerilla warfare in the Balkans. In the territory occupied by the Italians there had been, since the outbreak of the war against Russia, complete chaos. The partisans, Greater Serbian bands of conspirators, caused the German armed forces constant and heavy losses by ambushing them and committed inhuman cruelties to German soldiers. These bands were supported by Italian troops with weapons in their fight against the German Armed Forces. All attempts to induce the Italian army to fight the bands were useless. The Italians continued to supply arms. That was why Hitler gave me instructions to demand really sharp measures by the Italians against the Chetniks. He hoped by this means to induce the Duce to use all his influence upon the Italian supreme command and at any rate win some small success by tightening upoon the delivery of arms. That I should have used the words "extermination" and "elimination" appears to me very unlikely, but it was true I spoke of rendering them harmless. But I was convinced that the Italians

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would never dream of doing what my actual words conveyed. The success of our first conversation on 19th December 1942 (D 735) was on that account small. It appeared necessary in our second conversation of 21st February 1943 (D 741) to demand fresh and really brutal measures, directed against women and children as well. Of course I never spoke of women and children in general, and only meant those who took part as members of the bands that ambushed our men. When one considered what guerilla warfare was, such action was necessary.

Our conversation of 8th April 1943 (D 740) was on the same lines, as I again warned the Italians of the methods they were to use.

2) Documents R F 1207, R F 1210, R F 1220, R F 1504, and 3614 P S are concerned with the Jewish question in France. As regards their contents, I declare:

a) I know nothing at all about documents R F 1207 (memoir) and R F 1220.

Abetz was ambassador to the Vichy government. As such, he had no power to handle the Jewish question in France. The responsibility for the Jewish question in France lay alone with the police. The police chief appears, for some motive, to have applied to the Embassy to inform the French government through diplomatic channels about some measures planned. It is possible that at some of the consultations by advisors of other offices, a representative of the Germanyembassy in Paris may have been pr present.

b) According to the first two paragraphs of Document R F 1210, Paris office is considered as being competent from an expert point to deal with the combating of anti-German attempts originating from Jewry and, from a practical point of view, the Chief of the Security Police and of the SD as Jewish commissary for Europe. If, in the last paragraph but one of this document, there is a mention of thorough carrying out of Jewish policy in occupied territory and of making very few exceptions, apart from those caused by external events, it is intended to specify the representatives of the German embassy at the time, who were trying to work in a compensatory and restraining manner in accordance with my instructions.

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c) The figure 1/7 of document 3614 PS was necessary because very many Jewish families had fled from Paris and their dwellings were being looted. The same applied to Public Galleries. Abetz was instructed to get into touch with the OKW concerning the placing in safety of objects to which everyone had access. He also did this. The objects were placed in safety. But it was not a question of confiscating them and the Foreign Office, in particular, received none of them. These objects were taken over later by another Department of the Reich. I do not know anything further.

d) I know nothing about telegram R F 1504.

3) Document D 734 (R F 1501) arose from a large sabotage and espionage affair in the south of France occupied by the Italians. The instigators of this were Jews. The Italians had acted very indulgently towards acts of sabotage. Hitler therefore instructed me, on one of my visits to Rome, not only to hand the Duce a personal letter from him but also to tell the Duce, from a special note written in his own handwriting, what I have stated about the Jewish question in that document. All the communications were thus Hitler's own words in the form of instructions handed to me. I myself should have known nothing about all these matters.

4) I have the following remarks to make re. Affidavit KNOCHEN R F 1506:

The object of that conversation was to make it clear to the higher SS and Police Chiefs that Germany wanted to continue working with Laval, whom Himmler had the intention of overthrowing. On that occasion, also on Hitler's instructions, I pointed out that suspicious parties of the French resistance movement were to be arrested, as they might become dangerous to us if there were a landing by Allied troops. In order not to leave the police alone responsible for the carrying out of this policy, and to provide for unpleasant events which would be harmful to our foreign policy, I ininterpolated ambassador Abetz. If it is stated in the document that he was to take the matter in hand, that is not true because the Foreign Office actually had nothing to do with the arrest and incarceration of persons arrested. But it was to our interest to keep

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matters within prescribed bounds.

c) As regards the BONNET document, the statements made in it are lies from beginning to end. I never expressed myself in such a manner, not even to Bonnet, whom I myself considered a Jew. On the contrary, in reply to a query that evening I asked that a Jew named JEAN ZAY should be invited to a banquet that was being given in my honor.

In conclusion to the foregoing documents, I declare:

As a member of the Reich government I had to suit myself to the anti-Jewish policy of National Socialism. Nevertheless, from beginning to end I was always trying to lead the Jewish question towards a settlement in an evolutionary spirit, such as would be in accord with my inner personal convictions and my lines of foreign policy. I thus tried in the course of many serious explanations with Adolf Hitler, as well as in my memoirs, particularly in 1943, to get him to alter his policy regarding Jews and the Church. My earnest attempts were wrecked. I never agreed to criminal anti-Jewish measures. It is only during this Trial that I have learned of the terrible results of other people's influence.

Nuernberg, 1st July 1946 (Sgd.) Joachim v. Ribbentrop

The authenticity of the above signature by the former Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, made in my presence, is hereby certified.

(Sgd.) Dr. Martin Horn

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Supplement to the Document Book of

Joachim von Ribbentropp.

Ri - Exhibit No. 322

TC 75

C o p y

I, SIR DAVID JOHN MONTAGU - DOUGLAS- SCOTT, K.C.M.G. , a Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, HEREBY CERTIFY that the document, attached hereto and marked "C", is a Photostat Copy, taken from a Microfilm, now in the custody of His Majesty's Government, of a document formerly in the records of the German Foreign Office. AND I FURTHER CERTIFY that the aforesaid Microfilm was handed to British and United States Archives Investigators, acting under the authority of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, on May 19, 1945, by a member of the staff of the German Foreign Office.

(gez.) Daud Scott

Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1

10th. November, 1945.

H0792-0061

Confidential!

Strictly personal.

Notice to the Fuehrer

Berlin, 2 January 1938.

Final conclusions to the report "German Embassy London A 5522" regardi future conditions of Anglo-German relations.

cordh secretieren 14. I.

In the realization that Germany is not willing to bind herself to the status quo in Central Europe and that a warlike conflict in Europe is possible sooner or later, any hope for a settlement entertained by the pro-German English politicians will gradually wane - insofar as they do not play an assigned role anyway. The fateful question is thus raised; Are Germany and England to be forcibly driven into opposi camps in the end and march again one day against one another? In answe ing this question one must keep the following in mind:

A change of the status quo in the East can be achieved in the German sense only by violence. So long as France knows that England, who so to say took over the safeguarding of France against Germany, i. standing by, France's going to war for her Eastern ally is probable, at any rate always possible and thus an Anglo-German war is also possibl. This holds true even if England is unwilling to wage war; England, who believes to have to defend her frontiers on the Rhine, would be simply drawn into the war by France automatically, i.e. therefore France has it practically in her own hands to force an Anglo-German war through a German-French conflict.

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From this it results again, that a war between Germany and England because of France can only be prevented if France knows beforehand that England's forces would not be sufficient to insure the common victory. Such a situati could force England and thus France also to accept some things which a strong Anglo-French constellation would never tolerate. The case would occur for instance if England owing to a lack of sufficient armaments or because a menace to her empire by a superior constellation of powers (e.g. Germany-Italy-Japan) and a subsequent immobilization of her military forces in other places, would not be able to grant France sufficient support in Europe. As far as the constellation of powers is concerned, the latter depends on furth developments, on our policy of alliances and also on the further form taken by English relations with America. It would be a disadvantage for England, if without sufficient arms it had to stand up alone to the constellation mentioned. Certainly this constellation would have to be strongly united, an England and France should not have any doubt that Italy and Japan are standing strongly on our side and that if the occasion arose the common forces of the constellation would be used to strike. Italy and Japan have as much int est in a strong Germany as we have in a strong Italy and Japan. The existenc of the new Germany in recent years has been of great profit to the both of t in their endeavors to expand. In view of this and of common aims which are t be solved later on, one should manage to bring these two powers to declare th selves solidary with us at the proper moment. In such a situation it would be possible for England to prevent France/from intervening in the event of Germany beginning a conflict with one of its allies in the East, so that the conflict remained localized and England was not forced by France's intervention to fight under unfavorable conditions

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which would be infavorable for its world empire perhaps in three places, in East Asia, in the Mediterranean Sea and in Europe. In my opinion England would not risk a fight for the existence of its world empire because of a local Central European problem, even if Germany gave it strong support. In such a case France would hardly have the moral strength to assail the German fortifications alone without England in the west. In this connection it seems to me that the speed at which such a Central European conflict were brought to a victorious end would be a decisive factor. A longer duration could on the contrary awaken the idea in enemy countries that they had indeed overrated Germany's strength, and thus the moment of intervention of the Western powers would be brought nearer.

For this reason we have still more interest in my opinion in a strengthening of the axis Berlin-Rome and of the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokio and in the joining of further states in this constellation. The stronger our constellation of friends, the more easily would England and thus France keep out of a possible conflict involving Germany in Central Europe, and the conflict could remain localized to our advantage. I am even of the opinion that we should reinforce these friendships more and more and win new ones. The former French prime minister Flandin recently spoke in an article about the constellation of the European countries Germany, Italy and Japan and of the two democracies England and France plus Russia, which are striving each for itself, to win over as many countries as possible to their ideas, If in this one considers England's successful endeavors in several countries - I mention for instance Portugal which is again rapidly coming closer to England and where Auston Chamberlain's former private secretary (Selby) recently arrived, and Turkey

where Sir Percy Lorraine, one of the ablest British diplomats has exercised a strong pro-British influence on the Turks - this information of Flandin's seems to come from his British friends. Above all, in the future England will also attempt to weaken the axis Berlin - Rome, that is, to separatd the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo. Influential circles in England constantly worked for an understanding between England, Italy and Japan. In the summer the Foreign Office sent its best official, Sir Robert Craigo, to Japan. In order to safeguard the heart of the British Empire, it is my opinion that in due time England will do everything, even maybe under great sacrifices, to bring about again good relations with Italy and Japan, that is, to buy Germany out. It is my opinion that for this reason Germany, Italy and Japan have to keep close together, because therein lies the whole strength of the position in the world, and it seems advisable for all three countries to try and win the friendship of even the smallest states they can reach. Also as far as matters of communications and propaganda matters are concerned, I consider that one can hardly have enough of these frineds in times of need. It would be dangerous not to side with others because of a doubtful English friendship, and thereby to refuse a sure friendship. It would be the best way to fall between two stools. If this or that friendship should first be kept preferably on a looser basis or maintained as it is, or if this or that friendship should, for instance, already be welded in some form or other, for instance in the Anti-Komintern Pact, that would have to be decided separately in my opinion in each case.

As far as England is concerned, it is myyopinion that our policy should go on being adjusted and directed towards a full preservation of the interests of our friends. We must also continue to strengthen England's contention, that an adjustment and understanding between

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Germany and England is really possible in the end. This prospect could, for instance, even in the event of a local conflict of Germany in Central Europe, which did not affect England vitally have a slowing-down effect on the intent of the British Government as regards intervention.

It is probably better, if our separate constellation is kept rather loos outwardly, for the time being, In the long run, however, this will not be able to change the fact, that the formation of two opposite fronts will necessarily become more and more evident as time goes by. The question, if a German-English adjustment can then be reached at all, can be answered in my opinion as follows:

If England's position with its alliances is stronger than Germany and it friends, then, in my opinion, sooner or later it will always strike. If, of the other hand, Germany is able to conduct its policy of alliances in such a way that a German constellation is stronger or maybe equal to the British, then it is possible that England might prefer to seek an adjustment. With stiff fronts, however, a sudden adjustment of the manifold interests between these powers is normally unthinkable. It could only be attempted by two opposing nations, and then at the expanse of their partners in the constellat For instance, thinking along these lines one could, theoretically imagine th England, seeing herself up against a superior group, would suddenly offer Germany a far-reaching adjustment. Such a complete political volte face ofte occurred earlier in history, at the time when wars were still the personal affairs of monarchs, and when people often did not even know why they were fighting. It is hardly imaginable in our present modern politically-minded w and could certainly not be carried out by the democracies. The German compensation for such an offer,however,could be only made at the expense of its friends.

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Such a policy is in my opinion impossible for Germany. Let alc all other reasons, such a wavering policy would harbor an enormous risk, namely that of isolation. For, what kind of guarantee could Germany obtain from England for the fulfilment of such a proposal, forced by necessity? It seems to me such guarantee does not exist at all.

To the question whether an Anglo-German agreement is still possible, one may say that so long as the frohts are loose, such an understanding is still conceivable. It would be difficult, howe as can be seen from the attached reports and notice, because Germa wants to shape her future differently from what England seems to b willing to concede her in case of an agreement (see also enclosed letter of Lord Londonderry). Only a vigorous action by the English Prime Minister in our interests and against the mentioned signifi opposition might perhaps give a new turn to the state of affairs. is possible to imagine that an English Prime Minister if he is not overcome by the psychosis of German might and German thirst for power, but believes in principle in a potential Anglo-German frien shi , would still be willing to look for a broad and sober settler which would satisfy German aspirations without endangering vital ar exclusively English interests. That is the thesis advanced with su emphasis by Garvin in the "Oberserver" in the last few months. Wher I recently asked Chamberlain about his opinion on the last of Garv articles, he only said: "They are too long, that's why I do not re them!"-

A clear English concession in our interests in the Czecho-Aus probl m would purify the European atmosphere.

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On the grounds of my previous experience, however, I think such a change unlikely and I believe that England would tolerate such a solution at the best some day if compelled by force of circumstances. My view that this problem can not be solved by means of official negotiations with England is strengthene by the fact that Chamberlain both in his domestic and foreign politics (with France) is involved in a system which makes great decisions immensely difficult

Should the fronts once become motionless it could only be very special abnormal shifts of power or events in Europe or in the world the Bolchevising of France, the collapse of Russia, or other serious changes amongst our other fries which would drive the political development in a different direction. But on the basis of such possibilities one cannot built up a policy. Therefore, in my opinion it is correct to go on with our foreign policy along the lines on which we started.

In concluding I would like to sum up my view with the following catch words:

1) England is behind as regards armaments - therefore, she plays to gain time.

2) England believes that in the race with Germany time is working for England - exploitation of her greater economic potentialities for her re-armament - time to extend her alliances (e.g.America).

3) Therefore, the Halifax visit is to be regarded as a manoeuver to gain information and conceal facts - friends of Germany in England often only play a part which is given to them.

4) In my opinion after the Halifax visit England and her prime minister see no basis which seems possible to them for settlement with Germany - they believe National - Socialist Germany capable

of doing anything, just as we, too, believe the English capable of doing anything - therefore, they are afraid of being compelled some day by a strong Germany to agree to solutions they do not like - in order to obviate such a course England is adjusting her military and political measures for all eventualities towards a struggle with Germany.

5) Therefore, we must derive the following consclusions:

1) Continued agreement maintained outwardly with England while protecting the interests of our friends

2) The establishment in all secrecy but with great tenacity of a constellation of alliances aga England - which means in practice the strengthening of our friendship with Italy and Japan - furthermore, the winning over of all states wh interests are directly or undirectly the same ours - close and confidential collaboration of diplomatsof the three big powers for this purpose.

It is only in this manner that we can meet England, whether for an ulitmate settlement or conflict. England will be a hard and sharp opponent in this diplomatic game.

6) The special question of whether in the case of Germany having a conflict in middle Europe,France and thus England would intervene, will depend on the circumstances and date on which such a conflict breaks out and is terminated and on military considerations which cannot be evaluated here. I would like to explain to the Fuehrer orally a few aspects of this matter.

Such is my opinion of the situation after a thorough examination of all the circumstances. For years I have worked for a friendship with England and nothing would please me more than to see it established. When I asked the Fuehrer to send me to London

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I was sceptical as to whether this could be done, but in view of Edward VIII a last attempt seemed indicated. Today I no longer believe in an understanding England does not wish for an overpowerful Germany as a neighbor, offering a steady threat to her islands. She will fight for it. But National-Socialism is believed capable of doing tremendous things. Baldwin already recognized this and Edward VIII had to abdicate because one was not sure whether in view of his convictions he would cooperate in a policy inimical to Germany. Chamberlain has now appointed Vansittart, our most important and tenacious foe, to a post in which as a leader he can intervene in the diplomatic game against Germany. Regardless of what efforts should be made at tactical interludes of understanding with us in the future every day on which our political considerations are not in principle determined by the thought of England as our most dangerous foe, will be a gain for our enemies.

signed: R.

Certified copy:

(signed) Froeschmann
Dr. Georg Froeschmann

Attorney-at-Law